June 20, 2009

Watching events unfolding in Iran, I am reminded of the Islamic Revolution 30 years ago in which I was a horrified bystander. I knew that the revolution was going to be stolen from the young idealists who thought they were fighting for a European-style republic. They blithely ran off the cliff while Ayatollah Khomeini seized the reins. The old man tipped his turban to “democracy” when he immediately put a referendum before the Iranian people: a vote for or against the “Islamic Revolution.” This is like the Mafia making an offer one cannot refuse. For the past 30 years, the Iranian people have suffered from their folly. The young revolutionaries wound up in prison, exile, or were executed.

Now, even with the limited democracy that the clerics allow (they can veto any candidates they do not like and can reverse any laws passed by the elected parliament), this election was blatantly stolen. The government announced the results before anyone had a chance to count the millions of hand-written ballots. They said “Ahmadinejad won by a landslide.” Who counted?

The unhappy people in the streets do not believe it, nor do I. I posted my suspicion earlier in the week that Ahmadinejad had been carefully gathering all the country’s muscle (police, militia, Revolutionary Guard) and that it would be a matter of time before he became dictator, dumping the clerical “guardians.” Obviously many Iranians agree; there are signs held up in the demonstrations that identify Ahmadinejad as “dictator.”

Goerge Friedman, whose political analysis company Stratfor is usually spot on in their reports seems to have missed it this time. Friedman quite rightly noted that many “experts” on Iran are only English speaking and only interview the Iranian elites, who also speak English. He believed that Ahmadinejad did win the election because he is loved by the pious, the anti-western patriots (defiance over nuclear weapons), and the lower classes who resent the upper class elites. He said we need to accept this and not be deluded.

However, there are now plenty of Persian-speaking journalists and scholars who have been watching this election from its start—on the ground. They have not just been talking to the elites. A national pole taken early in May showed that the issues of most concern by the vast majority of Iranians were:

• The disastrous economy, blamed on Ahmadinejad’s incompetence;

• Concern over the disregard that most of the world holds for Iran and its president

• Desire for restoration of relations with the United States

• Desire for restoration of relations with Israel (a real surprise!)

• Desire for more personal freedoms.

Ahmadinejad does not represent any of these wishes. How could he possibly win an overwhelming victory? In addition, identity politics plays a role in Iran. Candidate Mousavi is an Azari, who most certainly would have gotten the vote of the heavily populated Azerbaijan, which the government denied.

George Friedman dismissed the votes of the Tehran elites (who obviously hate the clerics and Ahmadinejad); but how does he account for the demonstrations in Shiraz, Esfahan, Tabriz, and even the Shiite shrine city of Mashhad?

It is very difficult to predict the outcome of this heated election. But a few unfolding events are revealing. Supreme Leader Khamenei has blinked. He is alarmed (as he should be) and is trying to pacify the demonstrators by promising a “partial recount.” He should also be alarmed by his protégé’s dictatorial aspirations. A few other events to watch:

• The demonstrations continue unabated. Thugs attack them and despite state censorship, we are watching this. Murders have taken place—including raids on university dormitories with young girls thrown out of windows to their death. On June 18, Mousavi has called for a memorial march for the demonstration martyrs. This is the first, which will be followed by successive funeral marches every 40 days. Iranians are big on martyrdom funerals.

• There are reports that the military refuse to shoot into the crowds. The government then has to depend upon their thug corps, the “Basij,” who are violent and hated. There are also reports that Ahmadinejad has summoned Hamas thugs from Gaza—and they have been readily identified by outraged crowds in the street---as Palestinians.

Had the government accepted Mousavi’s victory, they probably could have hung on longer as Iran’s dictators. Mousavi at best would have been a Gorbachev, wanting to reform a dead system. But now, if Mousavi does take power, more will be expected of him.

This revolution is not over until the old man sings—hopefully from exile.

675 words Laina Farhat-Holzman is a historian, lecturer, and writer. You may contact her at Lfarhat102@aol.com or www.globalthink.net